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Abstract
We examine the importance of agency considerations for the mix of salary and performance-based
compensation in member-owned medical practices. Performance-based pay increases with the
informativeness of clinical productivity measures, and declines with greater reimbursement from
capitation contracts. Inexperienced physicians receive more compensation from salary, but
compensation mix does not change as physicians near retirement. Larger practices and practices using
outside management companies place more weight on performance-based compensation. However,
when more physicians in the group practice the same specialty, less emphasis is placed on performancebased compensation. Finally, the presence of an executive partner has no influence on compensation
mix.
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Performance-Based Compensation in Professional Service Firms
1. Introduction
Agency theory provides the underlying model for most empirical studies on
managerial incentives (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Bizjak et al., 1993; Garen, 1994;
Bushman et al., 1996; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1997; and others). However,
considerable debate still exists regarding the extent to which observed compensation
contracts reflect agency concerns. Prendergast (1999), for example, argues that empirical
research supports the notion that agents respond to incentives, but has been considerably
less successful in finding compelling results regarding the expected tradeoff between risk
and incentives.
The purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding of theoretical agency
considerations in the choice of compensation contracts. Our study examines the use of
performance-based compensation in professional service firms, an industry sector that
has been the subject of considerable analytical agency research.1 In particular, we focus
on compensation practices for physicians in medical group practices. This setting has
several distinctive features that enhance our ability to study a wide variety of agency
issues. First, unlike compensation contracts in most large corporations, physician
compensation contracts tend to be relatively simple combinations of fixed salary and
annual cash bonus.2 This simplicity enables us to obtain reliable measures of the
compensation risk imposed on employees. Second, although medical group practices
operate in the same service sector (thereby controlling for confounding industry effects
1

See, for example, Lee (1990), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Narayanan (1995), Ferral (1996), Gompers and
Lerner (1999), and Huddart and Liang (2002), among others.

that hinder cross-sectional studies spanning multiple sectors), their compensation
contracts exhibit considerable variation, ranging from strictly performance-based to
entirely salary-based. Third, some practices use the same compensation contract for all
members, while others vary their contracts by individual physician. Fourth, the plans
differ on whether performance-based compensation is based on a physician’s individual
performance, or on group performance with physicians receiving equal-shares of the
practice’s profits. Fifth, medical group practices employ a wide variety of ownership and
governance structures. Practices can be owned by the physicians or by outside
organizations such as health systems, hospitals, or management service organizations,
can be for-profit or non-profit, and can be managed by professional management
companies or by the physicians themselves. Variations in these dimensions, together
with the lack of confounding industry effects, allow us to conduct powerful tests of
hypotheses derived from general agency models, as well as from agency-based models
investigating compensation practices in professional service firms.
We conduct our analyses using survey data collected by the Medical Group
Management Association (MGMA). Our sample covers 16,659 individual physicians in
778 practices. Consistent with agency theory, we find that the extent to which individual
physicians in both member- and outside-owned practices are compensated using
performance-based pay increases with the informativeness of standard clinical
productivity measures. However, mutual monitoring by practice members and external
monitoring by outside owners or managers only serve as substitutes for performancebased compensation in member-owned firms. Physicians in member-owned firms also
2

Only 13.4% of medical group practices in our study provide stock or stock option benefits to any of their
physicians. Generally, these benefits are only provided when one of the physicians in the group is

tend to receive less performance-based pay when a greater proportion of firm revenues
are derived from capitation versus fee-for-service arrangements, consistent with efforts to
reduce goal conflicts between the physician and practice. In contrast, compensation
arrangements in outside-owned practices do not vary significantly on this dimension.
Although agency models generally indicate that incentive contracts should be
tailored to the characteristics and preferences of individual employees, 56% of the firms
in our sample use the same compensation contract for all members (i.e., the same mix of
salary and performance-based bonus, or equal sharing of group profits). In both memberand outside-owned practices, the use of a common salary/bonus mix for all physicians is
greater in smaller practices with little diversity in practice specialties. Member-owned
firms also tend to use a common compensation mix when surgeons represent a greater
proportion of members and when physicians staff hospitals, but tend to tailor the mix
when there is greater variation in physician experience and in the amount of time
physicians spend on non-clinical activities. However, similar tailoring is not found in
outside-owned practices. The use of a common compensation mix for all physicians is
not associated with contracting environment (i.e., capitation versus fee-for service) or
monitoring by external owners or managers. Finally, equal-share arrangements tend to be
used instead of salaries and/or bonuses in more technical practices where physicians have
similar specialties and experience levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our
research hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample and measures. Tests examining the
relative weights placed on salary and performance-based bonuses are reported in Section

appointed to manage the practice, and then only to the managing physician.

4. Section 5 investigates the factors influencing the use of equal-share compensation
arrangements. A summary and conclusions are provided in Section 6.

2. Research Hypotheses
2.1 Background
Physicians in medical group practices examine patients, diagnose ailments,
perform medical procedures, order and interpret laboratory tests, and provide other
healthcare services. As with most professional service firms, the practice is either
collectively owned by the physicians (i.e., “member-owned”) or owned by an external
party such as a hospital, health system, or insurance company (i.e., “outside-owned”). In
member-owned practices, the physician provides labor and, together with the other
members of the group, acts as owner. When the practice is owned by an outside entity,
the physician is an employee of that entity and typically holds no ownership interest.
Each employee in a professional service firm is an agent. The principal (or
owner) can be an outside entity or the collective group of practice members. Although
agency models typically assume complete separation of ownership and labor, Holmstrom
(1982) demonstrates that in member-owned firms, group members can collectively act as
a principal as long as the budget-balancing constraint can be relaxed. Professional
service firms can, and often do, relax this constraint by running deficits or carrying over
surpluses in any single year. As a result, we develop our hypotheses using standard
agency theory where a risk-averse and effort-averse employee’s actions cannot be
perfectly monitored by the principal. In the absence of perfect monitoring, professional
service firms can induce the second best level of effort by making the agent’s

compensation contingent on contractible and observable performance measures that
contain information regarding the agent’s effort choice.
Nearly all performance-based bonus plans in medical group practices are based
on measures of individual physician effort, such as patient encounters, relative value units
(RVUs), or adjusted charges (Pontes, 1995; Hurley et al, 1996; Latham Consulting
Group, 2001). Since details on the services provided by physicians are captured in
standardized medical charts, it is relatively straightforward in many cases to generate
standard, objective measures of physician effort that are related to the principal’s
objective function (Pontes, 1995; Pauly, 1996).
In contrast, patient satisfaction, quality of care, and other similar outcome
measures are rarely used to compute performance-based bonuses in these groups.3
Pontes (1995) offers several explanations for why performance-based pay is seldom
based on health outcomes. These include the difficulty writing contracts that consider all
possible contingencies that can influence outcomes (e.g., patients’ general health prior to
their illness, individual differences in response to treatments, compliance with treatment
recommendations, etc.); the fact that the utility of outcomes is a function of patient
preferences, about which the physician may have little information; the possibility that
outcome-based contracts may discourage physicians from accepting patients when the
outcome is likely to be unfavorable; and the significant incentives to provide high quality
care in the absence of formal outcome-based incentives (e.g., reputation effects and
threats of malpractice suits, license withdrawal, and dismissal from a practice). Given the
limited use of outcome measures, we develop our hypotheses assuming that performance-

3

Of the practices in the MGMA database, only nine percent use quality and 11 percent use patient
satisfaction measures for compensation-related decisions of any kind.

based bonuses in medical group practices are tied to standard clinical productivity
measures.
2.2 Research Hypotheses
Agency theory posits a number of factors that are expected to influence the
emphasis placed on performance-based compensation. We examine three factors that
have been prominently featured in this literature: the level of goal congruence between
the principal and agent, the informativeness of available performance measures, and the
ability to monitor agents’ actions.
2.2.1 Goal Congruence
Agency theory emphasizes the need to align the incentives of principals with
those of their agents. When the goals of the principal and agent are congruent,
performance-based compensation is not required to ensure that the agent’s actions are
consistent with the principal’s interests. However, in many cases the goals of principals
and agents are not perfectly aligned, increasing the need to use compensation contracts to
induce agents to operate in the principal’s best interest (Prendergast, 1999).
One situation where the goals of medical group principals and agents are expected
to diverge occurs when practices receive substantial revenue in the form of capitation
payments (Pontes, 1995; Leone, 2002). Under capitation plans, the practice receives a
fixed payment to provide care for a patient over the course of the year. The practice
generates revenue when the patient designates that practice (or a physician within the
practice) as his provider, regardless of whether the patient actually receives care. When a
physician treats a patient on a capitation plan, the practice generates additional costs (e.g.,
testing, supplies, administration, etc.), but does not generate any additional revenues.

Time spent with capitation patients also allows less time for fee-for-service patients.
Consequently, practices with substantial capitation reimbursement are likely to desire
fewer encounters and procedures per patient in order to maximize financial performance.4
Physicians paid on a productivity or fee-for-service basis, on the other hand, have
incentives to overprovide services to increase their compensation, even when the
additional services do not provide higher-quality care to the patient (Leone, 2002). To
minimize this conflict, Pontes (1995), Kennedy and Buckley (1997), and Leone (2002)
argue that performance-based pay should receive less emphasis when revenues from
capitation plans are greater in order to offset physicians’ incentive to overprovide
services. Thus, our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The extent of performance-based pay is negatively associated with
the percentage of group revenue received from capitation plans.
2.2.2 Performance Measure Informativeness
Agency theory suggests that the intensity of performance-based compensation
also depends upon the informativeness of available performance measures, as reflected in
their signal-to-noise ratio (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989; and Lambert
and Larcker, 1987). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), for example, show that in
situations where it is difficult to measure critical performance dimensions, aggressively
rewarding measured performance yields dysfunctional outcomes as agents allocate their
efforts to maximize compensation. Moreover, simply adding measures does not ensure
optimal allocation of effort because it creates incentives for employees to attend
4

We assume that the goal of medical practices, which are predominantly for-profit entities, is to maximize
practice profits, subject to quality constraints. We also assume that malpractice suits, reputation concerns,
and insurer scrutiny of bills effectively limit the extent to which physicians can reduce quality. Financial
viability is also important in practices owned by not-for-profit organizations (Prince, 1998), though
potentially not the most important factor (Newhouse, 1970). We control for non-profit status in our tests to
account for potential differences in objective functions.

selectively to those dimensions that are easily measured or controlled. Uninformative or
noisy measures also increase an agent’s compensation risk by increasing the likelihood
that an agent’s effort will go unrewarded. Consequently, reliance on performance-based
compensation should be negatively related to the extent to which the agent’s job contains
dimensions or tasks that are difficult to evaluate.
These results imply that medical group practices will use performance-base
compensation to a lesser extent when standard clinical productivity measures are less
informative. Yet, despite the strong theoretical support for this prediction, Prendergast’s
(1999) review concludes that empirical studies examining the relation between
compensation contract design and proxies for performance measure informativeness have
produced only mixed results. We therefore test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The extent of performance-based pay is positively related to the
informativess of clinical productivity measurse.
2.2.3 Monitoring Ability
Compensation contracts are not the only means to motivate agents.

Direct

monitoring by the principal or fellow employees provides an alternative to imposing risk
through costly contingent compensation contracts. When principals can directly observe
whether agents are taking desired actions, and can reward or punish agents based on these
observations, incentive compensation is not necessary to drive the agents’ behavior. For
example, agency models by Lee (1990), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Chee and Yoo
(2001), Huddart and Liang (2002), and others examine the relation between
compensation and monitoring by partners or team members, and show that internal
monitoring by peers can substitute for performance-based pay in some circumstances.

Other studies have examined how monitoring by external principals, such as
boards of directors or large shareholders, influences compensation plan design. The
majority of these studies examine the effects of ownership concentration and structure on
compensation plans in large, public companies.

Results have been mixed, leading

Pavlick et al. (1993) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) to conclude that ownership
concentration does not vary enough in these companies to significantly impact
compensation design, or that it has no influence on compensation design. Mixed results
have also been found in studies of small and privately-held firms. Ke et al. (1999) find
no association between executive compensation and accounting performance in privately
held insurance companies, which they attribute to stronger monitoring in these firms
relative to public insurance companies. In contrast, Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy
(2003) find a positive association between pay and accounting performance in small,
frequently private, firms, with a stronger association when the number of shareholder
increases.
Studies in the health care sector, on the other hand, generally support the tradeoff
between monitoring and incentive compensation. Lambert and Larcker (1995) find that
more active hospital boards of directors appear to monitor and direct hospital
administrators more closely, rather than using performance-based compensation
arrangements. Lee (1990) finds that medical group practices with a greater share of
capitated health management organization (HMO) patients place less weight on
productivity-based compensation but have more extensive systems for monitoring
physicians. Leone (2002) hypothesizes that it is more costly for national HMOs to
monitor physicians than for locally-owned HMOs due to the distance between

management and physician, leading to greater use of capitation compensation plans and
less use of fee-for-service incentives in the national organizations. He finds support this
hypothesis in for-profit national HMOS, but not in non-profits.
The discussions of monitoring-compensation tradeoffs in the agency literature
lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Performance-based pay is inversely related to the ability of
practice member and/sor other parties to directly monitor the physician.

2.2.4 Use of Common Compensation Plans
Although agency theory typically focuses on the design of compensation plans for
individual agents, many firms use common compensation plans for entire groups of
workers. The common plans can use the same mix of salary and bonus for groups of
employees, but tie the bonus payout to individual performance measures, or link
performance-based compensation to group results through team-based incentives or profit
sharing. Analytical models provide a number of potential explanations for the use of
common compensation plans. If the principal seeks to attract and motivate agents with
similar backgrounds, skills, and risk preferences, it may be optimal to compensate all
workers using the same mix of salary and bonus (Gaynor and Gertler, 1995).
Alternatively, as diversity in tasks and employee characteristics increases, monitoring
becomes more difficult and performance measure informativeness begins to differ among
employees, making common compensation plans for all agents less useful.

The use of common or group-based incentives is also likely to vary with the
ability of agents to cooperate and monitor each other. For example, Holmstrom and

Milgrom (1990) and Itoh (1993) demonstrate that in cases where it is Pareto-efficient for
agents to coordinate their efforts and share risks, it is optimal for principals to use simple
group incentive plans to encourage this activity. Che and Yoo (2001), in turn, show that
in situations where cooperation between team members is desired, team-based incentives
provide members with the motivation and means to exert peer sanctions, which lowers
the cost of incentives. Similarly, Kandel and Lazear (1992) demonstrate that equal
sharing of profits among partners creates incentives for peer pressure and mutual
monitoring. Moreover, their model indicates that the resulting peer pressure and
monitoring are more effective when workers are more homogeneous and perform similar
tasks, and when profits are shared by a small group. Thus, our fifth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The use of common compensation plans (i.e., the same mix of
salary and bonus or the use of equal share arrangements) is negatively associated
with the degree of intra-firm variation in monitoring ability and performance
measure informativeness.
3. Research Design
3.1 Sample
Our data come from a nationwide survey developed and conducted by the
Medical Group Management Association (MGMA). Surveys were mailed to 5,193
MGMA member practices in February of 1999 asking about their 1998 operations.
Responses were received from 1,772 practices. The MGMA staff eliminated 114 surveys
due to incomplete data reporting or duplication and 49 surveys due to late submission,
yielding an adjusted response rate of 30.98%.
The mean (median) practice in our sample has 20 (9) members. We retain
observations from physician-owned practices with five or more members. This
restriction is imposed because a minimum of 2 members is necessary for moral hazard to

be present and 3 members to prevent shirking from being directly traceable.5 We also
retain all observations from practices owned by hospitals, health systems, insurers,
foundations, and other external organizations because the physician is an employee (or
agent) of a larger organization. Our final sample consists of 897 medical group practices
and 17,332 individual physicians.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Performance-based compensation
The extent of performance-based compensation is measured using a survey
question asking respondents to indicate, for each physician in the practice, the method
used to determine compensation, from the following list: 100% individual productivity
(0% salary), 50-99% individual productivity (1-50% salary), 50-99% salary (1-50%
productivity), 100% salary (0% productivity), or 100% equal share.6 Examples of
productivity measures given in the survey instructions include gross charges, encounters,
and relative value units (RVUs). Consistent with evidence in the practitioner literature
(Hurley et al, 1996; Latham Consulting Group, 2001), this question assumes that
individual performance-based compensation is a function of clinical productivity. The
amount of compensation not based on productivity or equal shares is defined as “fixed”
or “guaranteed salary.”

5

Our results change little when the analyses are run with minimum practice sizes of three, ten, and 15
physicians.
6
The survey also allowed an “other” response to this question. Of the 24,541physicians in the MGMA
data base, only 217 (0.88%) gave this response. These responses are eliminated from our analyses. We
conducted a number of tests to establish the construct validity of our categorical compensation variable. As
reported in Appendix A, the statistical relations between compensation and productivity are consistent with
the categorical responses on pay-performance sensitivities. In addition, mean total compensation levels for
each of the survey categories confirmed that the amount of pay is increasing in the amount of risk imposed
on a physician.

In practices using some combination of salary and individual performance-based
pay, we measure pay-performance intensity for each physician using the midpoint in each
response category: 0 if compensation is entirely salary-based; 25 if 1-50% of
compensation is based on performance; 75 if 50%-99% of compensation is based on
productivity; and 100 if compensation is entirely productivity-based.7
In tests comparing the use of salary and/or bonus to the use of equal shares, the
variable Equal Shares is coded one if equal sharing of profits is used to compensate a
physician, and zero if some combination of salary and bonus is used.
3.2.2 Goal congruence
We test our first hypothesis using the percentage of group revenues derived from
capitation plans (denoted Capitation). We expect less weight on performance-based pay
when more revenue is received from capitation contracts, thereby reducing goal conflicts
between the physician and practice. Capitation levels range from 0% to 100% of
revenues (mean = 6.8%).
3.2.3 Informativeness
We use four variables to proxy for the informativeness of standard clinical
productivity measures.
Hospital staffing. Physicians in some groups are employed by or contract with a
hospital to staff a department. Physicians who staff hospital departments often have
relatively little control over their workflow, which is driven by overall patient volume at
the hospital. For example, the number of cases processed by hospital-based physicians
depends primarily on hospital volume, which is influenced by the hospital’s reputation
7

Since the performance-based compensation variable is based on categorical responses, we repeated

and various uncontrollable events (e.g., weather conditions). Consequently, clinical
productivity measures may provide little information on the physician’s effort level, and
may impose too much compensation risk on the physician. We therefore predict that
pay-performance intensity is lower for physicians in group practices that staff hospitals.
The variable Staff equals one if the group staffs a hospital department, and zero
otherwise.
Physician experience. Pauly and Gaynor (1990) find that a physician’s clinical
efficiency improves with experience. The initial years after residency may constitute
additional training for a physician where effort does not directly translate into clinical
performance. Young physicians may also expend effort in building a patient base and
reputation building that is not reflected in clinical-based performance measures. Thus,
the health economics literature suggests that the use of performance-based compensation
should increase with physician experience because clinical performance measures are
more informative about physician effort.
This result is similar to economics literature on partnerships (Akerlof and Katz,
1989; Lazear, 1991; Landers et al, 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). If the principal and
agent have the same initial information, less experienced professionals are expected to
work harder in the absence of explicit performance-based contracts in order to convince
the principal that they have high potential. Furthermore, less experienced workers may
be more willing to supply effort without performance-based compensation because doing
so increases the likelihood that the worker will survive in the firm long enough to attain
the high compensation that is earned by experienced employees.

analyses examining performance-pay intensity using ordinal logit, which yielded materially similar results.

An alternative perspective is that the principal does not know the ability of the
agent and uses performance-based compensation contracts to induce effort and/or to
attract more capable agents. Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Milbourn (1998), and others
develop this theory and find that as the firm gains more experience with the agent, there
is less uncertainty about the agent’s ability and less need to impose costly risk on the
agent. Thus, once the principal learns the agent’s “type,” an appropriate fixed salary is
paid to the agent and no compensation risk is imposed. Ignoring incentive issues that
may arise as the agent approaches retirement, this economic theory suggests that there is
an inverse relation between the use of performance-based compensation and physician
experience.
Although physician experience is an important factor in the contracting
environment, it has a theoretically ambiguous relation with the use of performance-based
compensation contracts. Since the impact of physician experience is unlikely to be a
linear function of years in the physician’s chosen specialty, we use two indicator
variables to measures the number of years the physician has practiced in his or her
specialty: <= 2 years, which equals one if the physician has two or fewer years
experience in the specialty, and zero otherwise; and 3-5 years, which equals one if the
physician has three to five experience in the specialty, and zero otherwise.
Non-Clinical Activity. Although medical group practices use productivity
measures almost exclusively when determining performance-based compensation,
physicians can have many responsibilities in addition to their clinical duties (e.g., resident
training, research, and administration). Traditional clinical measures provide little or no
information regarding non-clinical responsibility, and can induce dysfunctional behavior

(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Moreover, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) point out
that it is extremely difficult to measure tasks such as education and research, and argue
that in multi-tasking environments where effort is difficult to measure on some
dimensions, performance-based pay can be counter-productive. We therefore expect the
extent of a physician’s non-clinical responsibility to be inversely related to the use of
performance-based contracts. The variable Non-Clinical equals the percentage of fulltime-equivalent (FTE) units that a physician devotes to non-clinical work.
3.2.4 Monitoring Ability
Group Size. One factor that is likely to impact the ability to monitor the physician
is the size of the group practice. As the size of the practice increases, it becomes
increasingly difficult for physicians to mutually monitor each other or for external owners
or managers to assess agents’ actions (Holmstrom, 1982; Kandel and Lazear, 1992).8
Our first proxy variable for monitoring is the natural logarithm of the number of full-time
physicians in the group practice (denoted Size). We expect larger practices to place more
weight on performance-based compensation.
Physician Specialty. Another factor affecting the ability to monitor practice
members is the complexity of services performed by the physician. Highly specialized
physicians (e.g., neurosurgeons) often treat non-routine ailments that may not have an
established medical protocol or benchmark performance. In contrast, there are wellestablished standards for the number of patients a primary physician can examine
(Pontes, 1995). Thus, the ability to monitor a physician (either by other physicians or

8

Kandel and Lazear (1993) argue that incentives do not always weaken as firm size increases. For
example, agent effort might increase with the number of employees because of increased peer pressure also
increases with size and this mitigates the free rider problem. However, they also argue that the benefits
from more monitors are likely to decline as the firm gets extremely large.

other parties) declines as a physician provides a more complex service to patients. Our
second set of monitoring proxies therefore relates to the physician’s specialty grouping.
The three groupings include Primary care (family practice, general internal medicine, or
general pediatrics), Surgical (all surgical specialties plus the specialties of gynecology,
obstetrics, opthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, or urology), and Non-surgical
(anesthesiology, emergency medicine, hematology/onocology, nuclear medicine,
oncology, pathology, radiology, or other specialties not included in the primary care or
surgical categories). Each variable is coded one if the physician’s specialty fits into that
grouping, and zero otherwise. Based on their level of complexity, we expect surgical
practices to use more performance-based compensation than non-surgical practices, and
non-surgical practices to use more performance-based compensation than primary care
practices.9
Similarity in Specialties. Although the type of specialty is critical for monitoring,
physicians in member-owned practices can have very similar skills and this will increase
their ability to monitor each other (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). For example, it may be
very difficult to monitor a neurosurgeon, but this activity is clearly easier for other
neurosurgeons than for a primary care physician. Our fourth proxy for monitoring ability
is therefore the concentration of specialties in the practice. The variable Specialty
diversity represents the number of different specialties in the group scaled by the number
of group members (with smaller values indicating greater diversity). We expect greater
diversity to increase the weight on performance-based compensation.
Use of Professional Management Companies. Professional service firms
sometimes engage the services of an outside management company to help manage the
9

The Primary care grouping is omitted from the analyses to permit model estimation.

practice or perform administrative functions, such as invoicing and scheduling. These
firms are known as management services organizations (MSO) or physician practice
management corporations (PPMC). In many cases, outside management companies
provide services that allow practices to more closely monitor individual physicians
(Dynan et al., 1998). Accordingly, these services should improve monitoring and
substitute for the use of performance-based compensation contracts. We measure the use
of outside management firms using an indicator variable that has a value of one if the
practice uses an MSO or PPMC and zero otherwise (denoted Management co.).
Physician executive. Rather than using an outside management service, memberowned practices can appoint one of the group members to manage the practice and grant
him an equity interest. The executive partner essentially fulfills the role of the principal
because he does not contribute directly to the group’s productivity, but the value of his
ownership interest depends upon the productivity of the other physicians in the group.
However, the monitoring by this executive partner can substitute for the use of a
performance-based compensation contract. This is consistent with Alchain and Demsetz
(1972), who argue that inefficiency in partnerships will prompt partnerships to hire a
principal to monitor agents and grant the monitor an equity interest. Similarly, Huddart
and Liang (2002) claim that when monitoring is personally costly to a partner who
undertakes the monitoring, each individual partner shirks the monitoring task. Their
model indicates that it becomes optimal for partnerships to appoint one partner to
specialize in monitoring. Accordingly, productivity-based compensation is predicted to
be lower for those member-owned practices that have an executive partner. The variable

Physician executive equals one if a member-owned practice uses a physician executive
partner to run the practice and zero otherwise.
Outside Ownership. Some practices are owned by outside entities such as
hospitals, health systems, and foundations, as opposed to being member-owned practices.
These outside entities are in the business of administering the provision of health care and
have elaborate control systems that gather information on physician decisions. The
monitoring by these outside entities should substitute for the use of a performance-based
compensation contract (Lee, 1990). We measure outside monitoring using indicator
variables that have a value of one if the practice is owned by an MSO or PPMC (denoted
MSO/PPMC owns) or some other organization such as a foundation (denoted Other
owner). Hospital owned practices serve as the base case in the models.
3.2.5 Controls
Not-for-profit. Prior studies find less use of fee-for-service or productivity-based
pay in non-profit medical groups (Lee, 1990; Leone, 2002). We include an indicator
variable for practices owned by non-profit entities (denoted Not for profit) to control for
this possibility.
Labor markets. Compensation methods in medical practices are likely influenced
by labor market factors, such as the degree of competition, the extent of HMO
penetration, and the demand for physician services (Hurley et al., 1996; Leone, 2002).
Two sets of categorical variables are used to control for labor market influences. The
first set controls for urban, suburban, and rural settings. The second set controls for
region (Northeast, North Atlantic, Mid-Atlantic, Rocky Mountain, Northwest, Southwest,

Eastern Midwest, Lower Midwest, Upper Midwest, Southern California, and Northern
California). Urban and Upper Midwest indicator variables are excluded from the models.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Panels A and B provide information
on pay practices and professional characteristics for the individual physicians in our
sample. Significant differences exist between member- and outside-owned groups.
Whereas 61% of physicians in member-owned groups receive at least half of their
compensation in the form of productivity-based bonuses, only 40% of physicians in
outside-owned groups have more than 50% of compensation tied to bonuses. Similarly,
27% of physicians in outside-owned groups have no performance-based pay versus 14%
in member-owned groups. Equal shares are used to compensate 6% of physicians in
member-owned groups, but only seven physicians (0.0002%) in outside-owned groups.

Physicians in member-owned groups tend to receive higher total compensation
(mean = $258,409 vs. $178,983; median = $210,000 vs. $152,209), consistent with the
greatest use of performance-based pay in these practices. On average, physicians in
member-owned practices are less likely to work in primary care specialties (29.9% vs.
59.8%), have fewer colleagues in the group practicing the same specialty (1.86
physicians vs. 2.42), have more experience (13.8 years vs. 12.8 years), and spend less
time on non-clinical activities (4.4% of time vs. 6.6%).

Panels C and D examine variations in group-level pay practices and
characteristics. In both member- and outside-owned groups, the majority of group
members are covered by a common compensation plan. Overall, 51.4% of groups pay all

physicians using the same salary/bonus mix, and 71.0% use the same mix for at least
80% of their physicians. Equal shares are used in 121 groups (13.5%), only two of which
are outside-owned. Nearly 5% of the groups use equal shares for all physicians, and
7.8% use equal shares for 80% or more of their physicians.

Member-owned groups tend to have fewer physicians (mean = 9 physicians vs.
15), less diversity in the number of specialties in the practice (mean = 0.26 vs. 0.29), a
larger percentage of surgical and non-surgical specialists (mean = 40.7% and 37.1%,
respectively, vs. 12.1% and 17.4%), less variation in experience (mean = 0.77 vs. 0.84),
fewer physicians with less than five years experience (mean = 7.7% with two or fewer
years experience and 12.4% with three to five years vs. 13.3% and 18.8%, respectively),
and less variation in the amount of time spent on non-clinical activities (mean = 8% vs.
11%).

Outside-owned practices are more likely to staff hospitals (25.9% for outsideowned vs. 20.1% for member-owned) and receive more reimbursement from capitation
contracts (mean = 11.8% of revenues vs. 5.6%). However, the use of management
companies for providing administrative services is not statistically different in the two
groups. Physician executives are used by 12% of the member-owned practices, all of
which are for-profit entities. Nearly three-quarters (73.6%) of outside-owned practices
are owned by hospitals, 3.4% by MSOs or PPMCs, and 23.0% by other owners (e.g.,
universities, insurance companies, etc.), and 67.2% are non-profit.

3.4 Correlations

Table 2 provides correlations among the variables used in our physician-level tests.
In general, the correlations are quite small, suggesting no problems with
multicollinearity. Only three substantive correlations exceed 0.30 in absolute value.
Groups with more members are more likely to staff hospitals, receive more revenues in
the form of capitation payments. Physicians in larger groups also tend to work with more
physicians in the same specialty.

4. Factors Influencing the Weights on Salary and Performance-Based Pay
4.1 Physician-Level Tests
Our first set of tests examine the use of performance-based incentive plans that
base compensation on individual (rather than group) performance. We begin by
examining pay practices for individual physician. Since observations from physicians in
the same group may not be independent, Huber/White robust standard errors are used to
assess the significance of coefficients (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The robust standard
errors enable us to relax the assumption of independence within practices. Table 3
contains ordinary least squares regression estimates for member-owned and outsideowned firms. The model is highly significant (p < 0.01) for both samples, with adjusted
r-squareds of 30 percent and 46 percent for the member-owned and outside-owned
samples, respectively. Moreover, the results identify both similarities and differences
between member-owned and outside-owned practices.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, our measure of goal incongruence, the size of a
physician’s capitated patient base, is negatively and significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed)
associated with the use of performance-based pay in member-owned practices. This
suggests that a relatively high capitation base conflicts with the incentives created by

performance-based compensation plans in member-owned firms. However, capitation
levels do not explain compensation practices in outside-owned practices.
Results for both member-owned and outside-owned firms are consistent with our
hypothesis that performance-based pay receives less weight in settings where clinical
productivity measures are less informative. All four measures of reduced information
content (Staff hospital, <=2 years, 3-5 years, Non-clinical) are negatively and
significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed) associated with the use of performance-based pay in
member-owned firms. Coefficients on three of the four proxies for reduced information
content (<=2 years, 3-5 years, Non-clinical) are also negative and significant (p < 0.05,
two-tailed) in the outside-owned sample.
Our proxies for monitoring ability exhibit much stronger associations with payperformance intensity in member-owned practices than in outside-owned. As predicted,
physicians who have more practice colleagues with the same specialty receive less weight
on performance-based compensation. This relation is significant at the 5% level in
member-owned practice, and only marginally insignificant (p < 0.15, two-tailed) in
outside-owned practices. This evidence suggests that when a larger number of group
members practice the same specialty, mutual monitoring is more effective, allowing the
practice to impose less compensation risk on the physician. Size is positive and
significant in member-owned practices, consistent with larger groups making greater use
of performance-based pay to account for the greater difficulty in monitoring. The
coefficient on Size is also positive in the outside-owned sample, but is statistically
insignificant.

Contrary to our predictions, member-owned practices use significantly less (p <
0.01, two-tailed) performance-based pay for physicians in non-surgical specialties
relative to those in primary care specialties, and do not impose greater pay-performance
intensity on surgeons. In addition, specialty group has not significant relation with
compensation practices in outside-owned groups.
We also find no support for the prediction that external monitoring capability, as
measured by Management co. in both samples, Physician executive in member-owned
practices, and type of owner in outside-owned practices, is negatively associated with
performance-based pay. In fact, contrary to our predictions, performance-based pay is
greater ( p < 0.01, two-tailed) in member-owned practices that use outside management
companies than those that do not. This may suggest that management companies
improve the informativeness of performance-based measures by increasing the reliability,
timeliness and/or accuracy of performance data. Management companies may also
enable physicians to devote more time to enhancing their clinical skills and building the
practice, which eventually translates into greater clinical productivity.
Although we made no predictions regarding the impact of ownership on
compensation design in outside-owned firms, “other” outside ownership is both
negatively and significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed, respectively) associated with
performance-based pay, relative to hospital-owned practices. Foundations constitute the
majority of “other” outside-owned entities. Foundations are formed with the goals of
performing research in a specific field or caring for a defined population or disease.
Progress towards such goals is not easily assessed with common productivity-oriented
clinical measures, potentially explaining the negative relation.

4.2

Intra-firm variation in salary/bonus mix
In the second set of tests, we regress both a dichotomous and a continuous

measure of intra-firm variation in compensation methodology on proxies for variation in
internal monitoring capability and informativeness, and a set of control variables. The
unit of analysis in these tests is the practice. We include all firms in which the
predominant method of compensation is some combination of salary and/or bonus based
upon individual performance.10
The dichotomous measure of intra-firm variation in compensation (denoted Same
salary/bonus mix) takes the value of 1 if every member in the group receives the same
combination of salary and bonus (for e.g., all members receive 40% salary and 60%
bonus), and 0 otherwise. Results of the logistic regression using same salary/bonus mix
are contained in Model 1 of Table 4. The chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1
percent level or better in both samples, and the Negelkerke r-squareds are 22.7% and
31.8% for the member-owned and outside-owned sample, respectively. Consistent with
our hypotheses, the results suggest that the larger the group and the more diverse the
training, tasks, experience levels, and responsibilities of its members, the more likely that
the firm will vary the salary/bonus mix. The probability that a member-owned firm uses
the same compensation method with all members is negatively associated (p < 0.01, twosided) with firm size, negatively associated (p < 0.01, two-sided) with the relative number
of different specialties practiced (Specialty diversity), positively associated (p < 0.10,
two-sided) with the homogeneity of the specialties practiced (% Non-surgical and %

Surgical), and positively associated (p < 0.10, two-sided) with the use of team-based
production (Staff hospital). Further, the probability that a member-owned firm uses a
single compensation method is negatively associated (p < 0.05, two-sided) with the
degree to which group members vary in experience (Variation in experience) and nonclinical responsibility (Non-clinical variation). The results for Size and Specialty
diversity also hold in the outside-owned partition. Interestingly, in outside-owned firms,
heterogeneity in the classification of specialties practiced (i.e., primary care, nonsurgical, surgical), variation in experience levels, and variation in non-clinical
responsibilities do not appear to provide a significant impetus for outside-owned firms to
vary the salary/bonus mix.
The last two columns of Table 4 (Model 2) contain OLS regression results for the
continuous measure of intra-firm variation in compensation, % Physicians with same
salary/bonus mix. The model is significant (p < 0.01) in both samples; but, it has greater
explanatory power with member-owned firms (adjusted r-squared = 13%) than outsideowned firms (adjusted r-squared = 7%). The results support our hypotheses and reinforce
the findings from the logit model. Consistent with the logit model, the proportion of
physicians that are compensated in the same manner is negatively and significantly (p<
0.01, two-tailed) associated with size in outside-owned firms and Specialty diversity in all
firms.11 As in the logit model, the coefficient on S.taff hospital is positive and significant
(p<0.10, two-tailed) in the member-owned sample. In contrast to the logit model, the
10

The predominant method of compensation is the method used with the greatest number of members in a
group. The predominant method of compensation is used with at least 50% of a group’s members in all but
one of the 776 firms in our sample.
11
We also substituted categorical size variables for the continuous measure of size. Intra-firm variation in
salary/bonus mix is significantly ( p<0.01, two-tailed) lower in firms with 5-7 members when compared
with those that have more than 7 members. In the outside-owned partition, intra-firm variation in
salary/bonus mix is also significantly ( p<0.01, two-tailed) lower in firms with 8-10 members.

overall variation in experience levels is not significantly associated with variation in pay
practices in either partition. However, the coefficient on %<=2 years is negative and
significant (p< 0.01) in both partitions, which suggests that the salary/bonus mix used
with new physicians differs from that used with more experienced physicians. Finally,
consistent with the logit results, the greater the variation in non-clinical activities in
member-owned firms, the smaller the proportion of physicians that are compensated
using the same salary/bonus mix (p < 0.01, two-sided).

5.

Factors Influencing the Use of Equal Shares

In our final set of tests, we use a logistic regression model to compare firms that
compensate members on an equal shares basis (i.e., based upon the group performance)
to those that compensate members with some combination of salary and/or bonus (i.e.,
based upon individual performance, responsibilities, etc.). As in the previous set of tests,
the practice is the unit of analysis. Since only two of the outside-owned practices use
equal shares, we limit our anlaysis to member-owned practices.
A single firm may use equal shares with some members and a salary/bonus
combination with other members. T therefore, we use three different specifications to
test the hypothesis. In the first specification (Model 1), we compare firms that
predominantly use equal shares to compensate their physicians (119 firms) to those that
predominantly use any combination of salary and/or bonus (604 firms). In the second
specification (Model 2), we compare firms that use equal shares with all members (42
firms) to those that use the same combination of salary and/or bonus with all members
(349 firms).

Results are presented in Table 5. Both models are significant at the one percent
level, with Negelkerke r-squares of approximately 26%. Consistent with our predictions,
the results suggest that firms are significantly more likely to use equal shares when group
members generally practice in the same or related specialties and have similar levels of
experience. The probability that a firm uses equal shares is significantly decreasing in
the relative number of different specialties practiced (both models, p < 0.01, two-tailed)
and increasing in the percentage of members that practice in related specialties (model 1 p < 0.01, model 2 - p < 0.05, two-tailed). Firms whose members vary widely in
experience are less likely to use equal shares (both models, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Finally,
the firms in the first specification (model 1) that have a high percentage of new members
(2 or fewer years of experience) are also significantly (p < 0.10, two-tailed) less likely to
use equal shares.
The third specification (model 3) compares firms that use equal shares with all
members to firms that use 100% bonus with all members. Compensation is entirely
performance-based for all the firms in this specification. With equal shares, group
performance determines each member’s compensation, and with 100% bonus-based pay,
individual performance determines each member’s compensation. Consistent with our
prediction, the greater the variation in experience, the less likely that the firm will use
equal shares (p < 0.05, two-tailed). However, contrary to our prediction, practices that
staff hospital departments are less likely to use equal shares (p < 0.10, two-tailed).

6. Conclusion
This paper examines the determinants of compensation in professional service
firms and provides evidence that such firms support basic agency predictions regarding

the information content of performance measures and monitoring accuracy. Tests of
informativeness indicate that the proportion of risk-based pay is lower for those with less
non-clinical responsibility, presumably because standard performance measures provide
relatively little information regarding effort devoted to non-clinical tasks. Firms use
performance-based pay more extensively with physicians that have greater experience;
however, there are both informativeness-related and reputation-related explanations for
this result. Also consistent with informativeness predictions, the proportion of
performance-based pay is significantly smaller for member-owned practices that staff
hospital departments and serve a relatively large proportion of capitated patients. This
potentially indicates that such physicians have little control over the flow over their work,
and that standard clinical performance measures do little to indicated whether the
physician’s actions were in accordance with the organization’s objectives when patients
are covered under capitation plans.
Tests of the impact of firm complexity on the use risk-based pay also support
standard agency predictions regarding the risk-monitoring trade-off. We find that payperformance sensitivity increases significantly with practice diversity, size, and the
degree of physician specialization, all of which reduce monitoring accuracy. The impact
of diversity on pay-performance sensitivity is significantly larger in physician-owned
practices compared with non-physician-owned practices, while the impact of size on payperformance sensitivity is smaller. Consistent with predictions regarding monitoring
proficiency, physician-owned practices that appoint one of the co-owners to oversee the
practice use significantly less performance-based pay. Contrary to predictions, there is

no evidence that management companies improve monitoring proficiency within medical
practices.
In general, member-owned firms show more support for agency predictions than
those owned by outside entities, perhaps indicating that member-owned practices
potentially conform better to the simple agency model on which the hypotheses are
based. This seems reasonable, as non-physician-owned practices are owned by large
hospital, health system, foundations, and other organizations in which a board, or less
frequently, stockholders, constitute the “principal”. Simple agency models, which do not
directly address such multi-tiered organizations, may be better-suited for the flat
organizational structure of the typical labor-managed physician-firm. Furthermore, in
member-owed firms, the wealth of those actually negotiating contracts, i.e. the member
themselves, directly depends upon compensation contract design. Thus, they have a
significant incentive to choose an efficient contract. Conversely, in outside-owned
practices, the administrative employees who negotiate physician contracts on behalf of
the principal often have little or no explicit monetary interest in the performance of the
physician practice.
Finally, tests of intra-firm variation in pay-performance intensity indicate that the
larger the firm and the more it varies in non-clinical responsibility and medical
specialization, the more likely that it will vary its compensation methodology.
Furthermore, physicians practices that staff hospital departments are less likely to vary
compensation because tasks performed by individual members do no vary significantly.
These results further confirm agency predictions in that they demonstrate that variation in

compensation is attributable to factors that impact informativeness and monitoring
accuracy.

Appendix A
Validity Tests for Performance-Based Compensation Variable
Our performance-based compensation variable is based on categorical responses
regarding the proportion of a physician’s compensation based upon clinical productivity
measures. In this Appendix, we conduct analyses to validate the survey responses.
Specifically, we estimate pay-for-performance sensitivities using physician-level
compensation and productivity data. For each practice with at least ten members (n =
450 different practices), compensation was regressed on a measure of clinical
performance (denoted PERFORM), along with measures of a physician’s training,
experience, and non-clinical responsibility:
(A-1) INCOMEi = αi + β1,iPERFORM+ β2,iTRAINING +
β3,i EXPERIENCE + β4,iNON-CLINICAL + εi,j,
where PERFORM is a measure of clinical performance (gross charges or RVUs),
TRAINING is the number of years beyond medical school required for the specialty the
physician practices, EXPERIENCE is the number of years a physician has practiced in
his/her specialty area, and NON-CLINICAL is the proportion of a physician’s time
devoted to non-clinical work.
A.1 Clinical Performance Measures
Physician practices primarily based performance upon the amount of charges
generated by a physician, RVUs, or patient encounters, although some practices indicated
they used two or more of these measures to evaluate performance (Table A-1). 12 Out of
12

Professional gross charges is only an approximation of the actual charge-based measure used. Groups
reported using one of the following charge-based measures: gross charges, adjusted charges, and medical
revenues. Gross charges are the full value, at the practices undiscounted rates, of all service provided.

450 practices, 242 practices (54%) based performance on charges only, 37 (8%) used
RVUs only and 11 (2%) used patient encounters only. Ninety-seven practices (22%)
used some combination of these measures, while 63 practices (14%) did not use any of
these standard clinical performance measures to compensation physicians.
For the 63 practices that did not use clinical performance measures to evaluate
physician performance, 27 (43 percent) reported that they did not compensate physicians
based upon clinical performance (i.e., physician worked on a 100% salary basis), while
35 percent reported that they based less than half of compensation on clinical
performance. Thus, responses of those practices not using a standard clinical
performance measures are consistent with the compensation methodology reported by
these practices.
A.2 Estimation of proportion of pay based upon performance
Equation (A-1) was estimated for each of the 334 groups that used a charge-based
measure.13 Two-hundred and eighty (280) of the 334 groups had sufficient data to
calculate a coefficient for professional charges, β1, which measures the sensitivity of a
physician’s income to the amount of professional charges he generates. The coefficient,
β1, was significant (p < 0.10, two-tailed) for 90 percent of the groups. The proportion of
a physician’s compensation that is based on performance, denoted EST_RISK1, was then
calculated for each group as:

Adjusted charges are the total amounts expected to be paid by patients or third party payers. Medical
revenue is gross revenue net of refunds, returned checks, contractual discounts and allowances, bad debts
and write-offs. Adjusted charges or medical revenues are not reported at the physician-level. Thus, gross
charges is used as the performance measure for all firms that used any charge-based measure.
13
Including only the 281 groups that used just a charge-based measure does not materially affect
subsequent validity tests.

(A-2)

__(β1 x average charges)__
(Average group compensation)
The mean estimated proportion of performance-based compensation using (A-2)

was 74 percent. Although values ranged from –125 percent to 250 percent, the majority
of observations fell between 0 and 100 percent. Only 3 percent of firms had negative
values for the estimated proportion of performance-based pay, and in most of these cases,
the coefficient on physician charges, β1, was not significant. The estimated proportion of
performance-based pay exceeded 100 percent for 22 percent of the groups. There are two
potential explanations for this. First, professional gross charges may not be the actual
charge figure used in determining physician compensation. Second, factors besides
charges, such as administrative responsibility, teaching responsibility, or research
publications, may also indirectly affect compensation.
We also estimated performance-based compensation intensity for firms that used
RVUs to determine physician compensation (EST_RISK2).14 Only 38 of the 90 groups
had sufficient data to calculate a coefficient for RVUs, β1, which measures the sensitivity
of a physician’s income to the number of RVUs provided. The coefficient, β1, was
significant (p < 0.10 two-tailed) for 81 percent of these groups. The distribution of
estimated risk ranged from 0 to 200%, although the majority of observations fell between

14

We did not use patient encounters as a performance variable because encounters include ambulatory,
hospital, and surgical/anesthesiology services. The intensity and duration of a patient encounter differs
substantially across these 3 classifications. Thus, it is only feasible to measure income-encounter
sensitivity within groups in which the proportion of each type of encounter is the same across physicians.
However, few groups had consistent enough encounter patterns to estimate a reasonable number of incomeencounter sensitivities. Thus, patient encounters were not used to validate the reported compensation
methodology. Furthermore, only 69 groups used patient encounters to evaluate physician performance, and
of these 69 groups, all but 11 also used some other measure. This may reflect the difficulty in using
encounters to evaluate a non-homogenous group of physicians.

0 and 100%. The estimated mean (median) proportion of performance-based
compensation was 78 percent (72 percent).
A.3 Comparison of estimated proportion of performance-based compensation to
survey responses
The estimated proportion of performance-based pay is compared to the actual
compensation methodology reported using non-parametric correlations and traditional
tests for differences in means. Since the proportion of performance-based pay may vary
within a group, only groups in which at least 80 percent of the members are compensated
with the same methodology are included in the validity tests. This reduces the sample
size to 213 observations in the charge-based sample and 29 in the RVU-based sample.
Table A-2 illustrates that the average estimated amount of performance-based pay by the
actual compensation category reported in the survey. As expected, the mean estimated
proportion of performance-based pay is increasing in the amount of performance-based
pay reported. The non-parametric correlations between estimated risk and actual risk are
0.519 (p<0.01, two-tail) and 0.795 (p<0.01, two-tail) for the charge-based and RVUbased sample respectively. Means tests of the between subject effects indicates that both
estimates of the proportion of performance-based pay vary significantly by the actual risk
category reported (p<0.01, two-tail).
Finally, the validity of the categorical dependent variable is further investigated
by computing the mean value of total compensation for each category of dependent
variable. Agency theory posits that owners must pay agents more to induce the agent to
accept greater risk. Accordingly, the mean level of compensation should be greatest
when compensation is based entirely on performance. As illustrated in Table A-3, the

mean level of compensation does increase as the risk category increases and mean level
of compensation differs across categories.
Overall, our tests indicate that the self-reported proportion of performance-based
compensation is consistent with the observed compensation payouts. Thus, we believe
that the self-reported survey item is a valid measure for use in our empirical analysis.

Table A-1
Measures used in determining physician compensation:
Use of Patient Encounters * Use of RVUs * Use of Charges
Cross-tabulation of 450 practices
Use of RVUs
No
Yes
Do not use
charges

Use charges

Use of Patient No
Encounters

Total

63

37

100

Yes
Total

11
74

5
42

16
116

Use of Patient No
Encounters
Yes
Total

242

39

281

43
285

10
49

53
334

Table A-2
Estimated proportion of performance-based compensation by actual
category of performance-based compensation from the survey

FIRM_%RISK:
EST_RISK1: Mean
proportion of
Predominant method
of compensation for group performance-based pay
estimated using chargeas reported in survey
based measures
question

EST_RISK2: Mean
estimated proportion of
performance-based pay
using RVUs

100% Straight Salary

.1973 (n=10)

.4071 (n=5)

50% to 99% Salary

.5206 (n=43)

.4867 (n=8)

50% to 99% Productivity

.7249 (n=65)

.8970 (n=7)

100% Productivity

.9532 (n=5)

1.1306 (n=9)

All Categories

.7607 (n=213)

.7719 (n=29)

Table A-3
Mean level of compensation by actual category of performancebased pay reported in survey (n = 815)

Average total compensation
for FTEs > 0.8.
100% Straight Salary

$194,695

50% to 99% Salary

$210,820

50% to 99% Productivity

$272.334

100% Productivity

$283,159

Total

$243,771

ANOVA F-statistic

20.54 (p < 0.01, two-tail)
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics on medical group pay practices and organizational characteristics

Panel A: Physician pay practices1
Physicians
in member-owned groups
N
%
1,584
14%
2,083
19%
2,755
25%
4,049
36%
666
6%
11,137 100%

All physicians
N
%
3,242
19%
4,121
24%
3,573
21%
5,723
33%
673
4%
17,332 100%

0% bonus
1-50% bonus
51-99% bonus
100% bonus
Equal shares
TOTAL

Physicians in
outside-owned groups
N
%
1,658
27%
2,038
33%
818
13%
1,674
27%
7
0%
6,195 100%

Panel B: Physician characteristics 2
Physicians in
member-owned groups (N=11,137)

All physicians (N=17,332)
Mean
Total pay3
Same specialty
Primary care
Non-surgical
Surgical
Experience (years)
<= 2 years
experience
3-to-5 years
experience
Non-clinical activity

Physicians in
outside-owned groups (N=6,195)
Mean4

Median5

Std Dev.

$178,983***

$152,209***

$91,096

2.42***

2.30***

1.30

11.0***

9.1

0.0%***

15.9%

Median

Std Dev.

Mean

Median

Std Dev.

$230,910

$185,000

$152,800

$258,409

$210,000

$170,690

2.06

1.95

1.15

1.86

1.79

1.01

40.6%

49.1%

29.9%

59.8%***

33.4%

47.2%

38.5%

24.3%***

26.0%

43.8%

31.6%

15.9%***

9.0

13.8

8.0%

27.2%

7.4%

9.1%***

14.0%

34.7%

12.7%

16.3%***

14.8%

4.4%

13.4

5.2%

12.0

0.0%

12.0

0.0%

8.9

14.0%

12.8***

6.6%***

Table 1 (continued)
Panel C: Variation in group pay practices6
All groups
N
Combination of salary and/or bonus
Same salary/bonus mix used for all members
Same salary/bonus mix used for >= 80%
Equal shares
Equal shares used for all members
Equal shares used for >= 80% of members
TOTAL
Panel D: Group-level characteristics

7

%

# physicians
Size(log of # physicians)
Specialty diversity
% Primary care
% Non-surgical
% Surgical
% <= 2 years
% 3-5 years
Variation in experience
Non-clinical variation
Capitation
Staff hospital
Non-profit
Management co.
Physician executive
Hospital owns
MSO/PPMC owns
Other owner

2.47
0.27
31.6%
33.3%
35.1%
8.8%
13.6%
0.78
0.08
6.8%
21.2%
13.3%
14.2%
10.1%
14.3%
0.7%
4.5%

2.20
0.20
0.0%
7.1%
9.1%
4.7%
12.5%
0.78
0.05
0.0%

N

Outside-owned groups

%

N

%

776 86.5%

604 83.5%

172 98.9%

461 51.4%

349 48.3%

112 64.4%

637 71.0%

494 68.3%

143 82.2%

121 13.5%

119 16.5%

2 1.1%

43 4.8%

42 5.8%

1 0.6%

70 7.8%

68 9.4%

2 1.1%

897 100%

723 100%

174 100%

All groups (N=897)
Median
Mean
20.29
9.00

Member-owned groups

Member-owned groups (N=723)

Std Dev.
41.44

Mean
16.33

Median
9.00

Std Dev.
26.42

0.84
0.16
40.1%
41.7%
43.2%
11.9%
12.9%
0.26
0.10
13.9%

2.38
0.26
22.2%
37.1%
40.7%
7.7%
12.4%
0.77
0.08
5.6%
20.1%
0.0%
12.3%
12.0%

2.20
0.20
0.0%
9.1%
16.7%
0.0%
11.1%
0.76
0.03
0.0%

0.74
0.16
35.9%
43.8%
45.3%
10.8%
11.9%
0.26
0.10
12.8%

Outside-owned groups(N=174)
Mean4
36.75***

Median5 Std Dev.
15.00***
75.12

2.86***
2.71***
0.29*
0.25*
70.5%*** 82.9%***
17.4%*** 3.8%***
12.1%*** 0.0%***
13.3%*** 10.4%***
18.8%*** 15.9%***
0.84***
0.83***
0.11***
0.10***
11.8%*** 5.0%***
25.9%*
67.2%***
21.8%
73.6%
3.4%
23.0%

1.07
0.17
32.6%
26.5%
21.1%
14.9%
15.7%
0.24
0.09
16.9%

Notes to Table 1
1

Physician pay practices are as follows: 0% bonus – None of the physician’s compensation is derived from a bonus based upon individual performance, i.e., the
physician’s compensation is derived entirely from salary. 1-50% bonus – 1% to 50% of the physician’s compensation is based upon individual performance, with
the remainder derived from a fixed salary. 51-99% bonus – 51% to 99% of the physician’s compensation is based upon individual performance, with the remainder
derived from a fixed salary. 100% bonus – All of the physician’s compensation is based upon individual performance. Equal shares – Proceeds of participating
members are divided evenly among those members, irrespective of individual contribution.

2

Physicians compensated on an equal shares basis are excluded from calculations. Definitions are as follows: Pay – Total annual compensation in dollars. Same
specialty – Log of the number of physicians in the practice that have the same specialty as a physician. Primary care – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician’s
specialty is primary care, and 0 otherwise. Non-surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a non-surgical specialist, and 0 otherwise. Surgical –
Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a surgical specialist, and 0 otherwise. <=2 years – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 2 or less years
experience, and 0 otherwise. 3-5 years – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 3 to 5 years experience, and 0 otherwise. Non-clinical activity –
Percentage of time physician is engaged in non-clinical activities.

3

Not all physicians supplied dollar amounts of compensation. Thus, full sample for total pay contains only 15,060 physicians vs. 16,659.

4

**, * indicate that null hypothesis of equal means for member-owned and outside-owned partitions can be rejected at significance level of 1% and 5% respectively.

5

**, * indicate that null hypothesis that member-owned and outside-owned partitions were drawn from same population can be rejected at significance level of 1%
and 5% respectively.
6

Combination of salary and/or bonus – Predominant method of compensation used by group (i.e., method used with highest percentage of members) is some
combination of salary and bonus based upon individual performance. Various combinations of salary and bonus are detailed in Panel A. Same salary/bonus mix
used with all members – The same combination of salary and bonus (for e.g., 30% salary and 70% bonus) is used with every member of the group. Same
salary/bonus mix used with >= 80% – The same combination of salary and bonus is used with at least 80% of the group members. Equal shares – Proceeds of
participating members are divided evenly among those members, irrespective of individual contribution. Equal shares used with all members – Every member of the
group participates in equal shares distribution. Equal shares used with >= 80% of members – At least 80% of group members are compensating using equal shares.
For example, a 10-member group may have only 9 members that participate on an equal shares basis. In this case, the proceeds of the group are pooled and the net
proceeds are distributed evenly among those 9 members, while the remaining member receives a salary and/or bonus based upon his/her individual performance.
7

Group-level characteristics exclude groups in which equal shares is predominant method of compensation. Definitions are as follows: % physicians with same
salary/bonus mix – Percentage of group members that are compensated using the same combination of salary and bonus. # physicians – number of physicians in the
practice. Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice. Specialty diversity – Number of different specialties in practice scaled by the number of physicians.
Larger values indicate a more diverse mix of specialties. % Primary care – Percentage of group members that practice primary care specialties. % Non-surgical –
Percentage of group members that practice non-surgical specialties % Surgical – Percentage of group members that practice surgical specialties. % <=2 years –
Percentage of group members with 2 or fewer years experience. % 3-5 years – Percentage of group members with 3-to-5 years of experience. Staff hospital –
Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise. Capitation- Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation
insurance programs. Management co. – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice uses an MSO or PPMC, and 0 otherwise. Physician executive – Indicator variable
that equals 1 if practice has appointed a physician-member to manage the group. Hospital owns, MSO/PPMC owns, and other owner are indicator variables that
equal 1 if the practice is owned by a hospital/health system, management service organization/physician practice management company, or some other outside
owner, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Non-profit – Indicator variable that equals 1 if the entity that owns practice is a not-for-profit entity, and 0 otherwise.

Table 2
Pearson correlations1, 2, 3
N = 16,659 physicians
Same
specialty

Nonsurgical

3-5 years

Management co.

0.40
(0.00)

1.00

Same specialty

0.13
(0.00)

0.44
(0.00)

1.00

Non-surgical

-0.01
(0.29)

0.06
(0.00)

-0.19
(0.00)

1.00

Surgical

-0.09
(0.00)

-0.17
(0.00)

-0.28
(0.00)

-0.41
(0.00)

1.00

Staff hospital

0.23
(0.00)

0.38
(0.00)

0.15
(0.00)

0.19
(0.00)

-0.10
(0.00)

1.00

<= 2 years

-0.01
(0.49)

-0.04
(0.00)

-0.03
(0.00)

-0.05
(0.00)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.03
(0.00)

1.00

3-5 years

-0.01
(0.45)

-0.01
(0.06)

-0.01
(0.13)

0.00
(0.84)

-0.02
(0.00)

-0.01
(0.05)

-0.12
(0.00)

1.00

Non-clinical

-0.01
(0.21)

0.02
(0.00)

0.03
(0.00)

0.02
(0.01)

-0.06
(0.00)

0.05
(0.00)

0.01
(0.12)

-0.01
(0.48)

1.00

Management
co.

0.19
(0.00)
0.07

0.18
(0.00)
0.00

0.03
(0.00)
0.02

-0.01
(0.15)
0.05

-0.03
(0.00)
-0.02

0.11
(0.00)
-0.01

0.01
(0.14)
0.01

-0.02
(0.01)
-0.01

0.01
(0.30)
-0.01

-0.07

(0.00)
0.40

(0.92)
1.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.51)

(0.19)

(0.08)

(0.23)

(0.00)

Physician
executive

<= 2 years

Nonclinical

Size

Size

Surgical

Staff
hospital

Capitation

1.00

Notes to Table 2
1
2
3

Two-tailed significance levels are in ( ) below correlation coefficient.
Correlation coefficients do not vary significantly when sample is partitioned into member-owned and outside-owned practices.

Variable definitions: Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation insurance programs. Size – Log of the number of
physicians in the practice. Same specialty – Log of the number of physicians in the practice that have the same specialty as a physician. Non-surgical –
Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a non-surgical specialist, and 0 otherwise. Surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a surgical
specialist, and 0 otherwise. Staff hospital – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise. <=2 years-Indicator
variable that equals 1 if physician has 2 or less years of experience, and 0 otherwise. 3-5 years – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 3 to 5 years
of experience, and 0 otherwise. Non-clinical – Percentage of time physician is engaged in non-clinical activities. Management co. – Practice engages the
services of a MSO or PPMC. Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician-member to manage the group.

Table 3
Performance-based compensation as a percentage of total individual pay1

Variable2
Constant

Predicted sign

Member-owned practices

Outside-owned practices

Coefficient (t-stat)
93.12 ***
(13.59)

Coefficient (t-stat)
71.98 ***
(6.00)

Goal congruence
Capitation

-

-45.43
(-6.65)

***

-3.94
(-0.19)

Informativeness
Staff hospital

-

***

<= 2 years

-

3-5 years

-

Non-clinical

-

-15.42
(-4.19)
-27.56
(-11.77)
-9.00
(-7.19)
-14.01
(-3.11)

-9.00
(-1.20)
-15.02
(-4.01)
-5.00
(-2.61)
-12.41
(-2.42)

+/-

4.37
(2.93)

***

2.21
(0.98)

-

-3.02
(-2.35)
-12.60
(-4.63)
0.51
(0.21)
8.60
(2.16)
1.20
(0.28)

**

-3.19
(-1.58)
-6.61
(-1.57)
-3.74
(-1.15)
-5.76
(-0.72)

Monitoring ability
Size
Same specialty
Non-surgical

+

Surgical

+

Management co.

-

Physician executive

-

MSO/PPMC owns
Other owner

***
***
***

***

**

12.38
(1.31)
-29.94
(-3.36)

***
***
**

***

Table 3, continued
Control variables4

Member-owned practices

Non-profit
Suburb
Rural
Northeast
North Atlantic
Mid Atlantic
Rocky mountain
Northwest
Southwest
Eastern Midwest
Lower Midwest
Southern CA
Northern CA
Number of physicians
Number of practices
F-statistic
R-squared4

-11.68
(-3.10)
-14.26
(-3.70)
-29.05
(-2.84)
-36.64
(-5.45)
-20.97
(-2.83)
-11.52
(-2.25)
6.51
(1.59)
-6.99
(-1.68)
-10.19
(-2.48)
-9.82
(-1.90)
0.38
(0.05)
-4.31
(-0.26)
10,471
681
25.1
30.50%

***
***
***
***
***
**

*

*

Outside-owned practices
2.34
(0.39)
-7.04
(-0.94)
15.07 *
(1.82)
-25.66 **
(-2.44)
-52.81 ***
(-4.48)
-39.93
(-3.95)
-18.03 *
(-1.69)
-23.79 *
(-1.84)
-20.91 **
(-2.36)
-30.89 ***
(-3.80)
-12.97
(-0.87)

18.86
(2.38)

***

6,188
173
34.57
46.31%

**

***

1

Dependent variable is the percentage of a physician’s total pay that is based upon individual performance, i.e., bonus as
percentage of total compensation. The bonus portion can constitute 0%, 25%, 75%, or 100% of compensation.

2

Variable definitions: Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation insurance programs.
Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice. Same specialty – Log of the number of other physicians in the
practice that have the same specialty as a physician. Non-surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a nonsurgical specialist, and 0 otherwise. Surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a surgical specialist, and 0
otherwise. Staff hospital – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise. <=2
years –Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 2 or less years experience, and 0 otherwise. 3-5 years – Indicator
variable that equals 1 if physician has 3 to 5 years experience, and 0 otherwise. Non-clinical – Percentage of time
physician is engaged in non-clinical activities. Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician member to
manage the group. Management co. – Practice engages the services of a MSO or PPMC. Hospital owns, MSO/PPMC
owns, and other owner are indicator variables that equal 1 if the practice is owned by a hospital/health system,
management service organization/physician practice management company, or some other outside owner, respectively,
and 0 otherwise. Non-profit – Indicator variable that equals 1 if the entity that owns practice is a not-for-profit entity, and
0 otherwise.

3

Indicator variables for metropolitan area and region. Missing area variable is urban. Missing region is Upper Midwest.
No outside-owned practices in the sample are located in Southern California.

4
If control variables are removed from models, values for r-square drop to 22.5% for member-owned firms and 28.3%
for outside-owned firms.

*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance levels for test statistics of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Table 4
Intra-firm variation in the use of salary and bonus1

Variable4
Constant

Model 1 (Logit model)
Same salary/bonus mix used
for all physicians in practice 2
Member-owned Outside-owned
Predicted sign
Coefficient (Wald statistic)
3.08 ***
3.18 ***
(3.92)
(22.27)

Model 2 (OLS model)
% of physicians in practice
with same salary/bonus mix 3
Member-owned
Outside-owned
Coefficient (t-statistic)
1.00 ***
1.06***
(34.34)
(17.39)

Goal congruence
0.53
(0.45)

Capitation

0.42
(0.12)

0.003
(0.06)

0.11 *
(1.77)

Informativeness
Staff hospital

+

% <= 2 years

-

% 3-5 years

-

Variation in
experience
Non-clinical variation

-

0.44 *
(2.84)
-1.15
(-0.73)
0.21
(0.06)
-1.22 **
(-4.47)
-3.87 ***
(-16.69)

-0.14
(-0.08)
-1.99
(-1.83)
0.14
(0.01)
0.18
(0.04)
-1.86
(-0.66)

0.026 *
(1.84)
-0.215 ***
(-2.84)
-0.086 *
(-1.88)
-0.021
(-0.67)
-0.319 ***
(-6.25)

-0.02
(-0.80)
-0.17***
(-2.27)
0.02
(0.28)
0.01
(0.30)
-0.09
(-0.81)

-0.008
(-1.17)
-0.077 ***
(-2.46)
0.019
(1.19)
0.026
(1.47)
-0.010
(-0.63)
-0.015
(-0.94)

-0.04***
(-3.50)
-0.19***
(-2.67)
0.00
(0.05)
0.05
(1.22)
0.02
(0.76)

Monitoring ability
Size5

+/-

Specialty diversity

-

% Non-surgical

+

% Surgical

+

Management co.
Physician executive

-0.61 ***
(-20.97)
-1.73 ***
(-9.02)
0.65 *
(3.58)
0.69 **
(5.28)
-0.37
(-1.64)
0.09
(0.10)

MSO/PPMC owns

-0.43
(-0.13)
0.50
(1.00)

Other owner

Number of practices7
Negelkerke or Adj. R-square
Chi square or F statistic

-0.78***
(-10.65)
-4.16 ***
(-8.09)
0.78
(0.86)
-0.32
(-0.10)
0.37
(0.46)

604
22.7%
111.7 ***

172
31.8%
45.1***

0.87
(0.16)
0.53
(0.63)
604
13.47%
8.83 ***

172
6.91%
1.91***

Notes to Table 4
1

The analyses include only firms whose predominant method of compensation is a combination of salary and bonus.
Firms that predominantly use equal shares (119 member-owned and 2 outside-owned firms) are excluded from this
analysis. Including these firms reduces the significance of % surgical and % staff hospital, but does not materially
impact our conclusions.

2

Logistic regression. Dependent variable equals 1 (349 firms) if every group member receives the same combination of
salary and/or bonus and 0 otherwise (255 firms). We also repeated the analysis after recoding the dependent variable to
equal 1 if at least 80% of a groups members receive the same combination of salary and/or bonus, and 0 otherwise. This
reduced the significance of the % non-surgical, % surgical and % staff hospital variables, but did not materially affect
our conclusions.

3

Ordinary least squares regression. Dependent variable is the percentage of group members that receive the same
combination of salary and/or bonus. Higher values indicate greater intra-group uniformity in compensation.

4

Independent variables: Specialty concentration – Number of different specialties in group scaled by the number of
group members (smaller values indicate greater diversity in specialties). % Non-surgical – % of group members in nonsurgical specialties. % Surgical – % of group members in a surgical specialties. Staff hospital – Indicator variable that
equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise. % <=2 years – % of group members with less than 2
years experience. % 3-5 years – % of group members with 3 to 5 years of experience. Variation in experience –
standard deviation of group members’ experience. Non-clinical variation – Standard deviation of the percentage of time
group members are engaged in non-clinical activities. Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered
by capitation insurance programs. Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice. Management co.–Practice has
engaged the services of a MSO or PPMC. Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician-member to manage
the group. Hospital owns, MSO/PPMC owns, and other owner are indicator variables that equal 1 if the practice is
owned by a hospital/health system, management service organization/physician practice management company, or some
other outside owner that is not a hospital/health system or MSO/PPMC, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Non-profit –
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the entity that owns practice organizes as a not-for-profit, and 0 otherwise.
5

We also used indicator variables to compare intra-firm variation in compensation for firms with 5-7 members and 8-10
members to firms with more than 10 members. Intra-firm variation in compensation is significantly lower ( p<0.01,
two-tailed) firms with 5-7 members and 8-10 members when compare to firms with more than 10 members. This is
consistent with the result for size, in which intra-firm variation in compensation methodology is increasing in firm size.
6

Controls for metropolitan area and geographic region were included in the logistic regression, but are not shown in the
table. Controls for metropolitan area and geographic region were not included in the OLS regression because did not
statistically significantly improve the models fit.
6

The number of firms (604 + 172 = 776) does not agree with the number of firms in the physician-level analysis (Table
3: 682 + 173 = 855) because 244 physicians that receive a salary/bonus mix, and hence are included in the physicianlevel analysis, work in 125 firms that predominantly use equal shares, and thus are excluded from this analysis.
7

Change in R-square and F-statistic if control variables for metropolitan location and geographical region (suburban,
rural, Northeast, etc.) are included in the OLS model.
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. “n.s.” not significant at a level
of 10% or better.

Table 5
Use of team-based (equal shares) vs. individual-based (salary/bonus) compensation
in member-owned firms (logit model)1, 2

Variable3

Predicted

Constant

Model 1
Predominantly ES vs
Predominantly S/B

Model 2
100% ES vs.
100% same S/B mix

Model 3
100% ES vs.
100% All Bonus

Coeff (Wald statistic)

Coeff (Wald statistic)

Coeff (Wald statistic)

-1.41

0.90

2.81

(1.60)

(0.27)

(1.49)

-0.86

-1.80

-4.29

(0.47)

(0.50)

(1.39)

-0.11

-0.58

(0.16)

(1.32)

(3.44)

0.81

-0.58

(2.86)

(0.15)

(0.03)

-0.04

1.12

0.89

(0.00)

(0.43)

(0.13)

Goal congruence

Capitation
Informativeness
Staff hospital
% <= 2 years
% 3-5 years
Variation in experience
Non-clinical variation

+
-

2.19*

-1.06***

-3.36***

-1.32 *

-3.42 **

(12.05)

(5.64)

(5.64)

-0.86

-1.80

-4.29

(0.47)

(0.50)

(1.39)

-0.32

-0.27

0.01

(2.70)

(0.56)

(0.00)

Monitoring ability
Size4
Specialty diversity

-

-4.16***
(15.13)

% Non-surgical

+

2.72***
(22.82)

% Surgical
Management Co.
Physician executive

Number of practices
Negelkerke R-square
Chi-Squared

+

-5.69***
(6.98)
1.81**

-3.84
(1.39)
1.43

(4.46)

(1.22)

0.76

1.42

(6.84)
1.28
(1.16)

(0.84)
2.66
(2.29)

(1.41)
3.72
(1.83)

0.39
(1.28)

0.23
(0.13)

0.88
(0.90)

723

391

179

26.06%

26.30%

38.50%

120.95

54.38

32.52

1.47***

Notes to Table 5
1

Model 1 includes all firms. Dependent variable equals 1 if predominant method of compensation (i.e., form used
most often) is equal shares (119 firms), and 0 if predominant method of compensation is some combination of salary
and/or bonus (604 firms). In all but one case, predominant method of compensation is used with at least 50% of the
group members.
Model 2 includes only firms that compensate all members using equal shares and those that use the same salary/bonus
combination with all members. The dependent variable is equals 1 if 100% of the group members are compensated
using equal shares (42 firms), and 0 if 100% of group members are compensated using the same mix of salary and
bonus (349 firms). Firms that vary compensation by member are excluded from this analysis.
Model 3 includes only firms that compensate all members using equal shares and those that compensate all members
with 100% bonus. The dependent variable equals 1 if 100% of the group members are compensated using equal
shares (42 firms), and 0 if 100% of group members’ compensation is entirely based upon individual performance or
bonus (54 firms). Firms that vary compensation member and firms that use a method other than equal shares or 100%
performance-based bonus are excluded.
2

Of the 121 practices that use equal shares, only 2 of these practices are outside-owned. Hence, corresponding model
for outside-owned practices is not significant and is not shown.

3

Independent variables: Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice. Specialty concentration – Number of
different specialties in group scaled by the number of group members (smaller numbers indicate greater diversity in
specialties among group numbers). % Non-surgical – % of group members in a non-surgical specialty. % Surgical –
% of group members in a surgical specialty. Staff hospital – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a
hospital department, and 0 otherwise. Variation in experience – standard deviation of group members experience. %
<=2 years – % of group members with less than 2 years experience. % 3-5 years – % of group members with 3 to 5
years of experience. Non-clinical variation – Standard deviation of the percentage of time group members are engaged
in non-clinical activities. Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation insurance
programs. Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician-member to manage the group. Management co. –
Practice has engaged the services of a MSO or PPMC.

4

We also used indicator variables to compare intra-firm variation in compensation for firms with 5-7 members and
those with 8-10 members to firms with more than 10 members. Consistent with the above result for size, neither
indicator variable was significant.
5

Control variables for metropolitan location and geographical region (suburban, rural, Northeast, etc.) are included in
the model, but are not shown. Negelkerke R-square and chi-square statistic without metropolitan and regional
controls are 20.9% and 95.56, 21.3% and 43.23, and 24.4% and 19.26 for models 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

